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automatic stay, accorded priority to PNC’s mortgage, and canceled Wells Fargo’s mortgage.10 
Subsequently, PNC foreclosed on the property and the bankruptcy court’s order was recorded in 
the Wake County Register of Deeds.11 Thereafter, AMH Roman Two NC, LLC (“AMH”) 
purchased the property relying, in part, on the order cancelling Wells Fargo’s mortgage.12   
 After learning that its mortgage was canceled by the bankruptcy court’s order, Wells 
Fargo moved to set aside the order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b).13 Specifically, 
it argued that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to cancel the lien because the order 
resulted from a motion, rather than an adversary proceeding.14 The bankruptcy court denied the 
motion to set aside the order canceling the mortgage because the motion was untimely, and 
because granting the motion would unfairly prejudice AMH.15 On appeal, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina16 and thereafter the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit17 affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, finding that Wells 
Fargo failed to act to prevent the foreclosure despite receiving adequate notice and due process.18 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted that AMH was a bona fide purchaser who relied in good faith 
on the bankruptcy court order when it purchased the property in foreclosure.19 
Central to Wells Fargo’s claim was that Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary 
proceeding to determine the “validity, extent, or priority of a lien.”20 However, failure to initiate 
                                                
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See id; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (“Rule 60 F. R. Civ. P. applies in cases under the Code.”).  
14 See id. 
15 See id.  
16 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Farag, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66144, 2016 WL 2944561, at *12-13 (E.D.N.C. May 
18, 2016).  
17 See Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d at 298. 
18 See id.  
19 See id.  
20 See id. at 301.  
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an adversary proceeding is not a constitutional error and affords no basis to void an order.21 
Congress has vested bankruptcy courts with broad authority to determine the “validity, extent, or 
priority of a lien,”22 and the Supreme Court has recognized that this authority flows “from the 
Bankruptcy Rules . . . , which are ‘procedural rules . . . that are not jurisdictional.’”23 Even if 
there was a jurisdictional flaw, Rule 60(b) judgments are void “only when the jurisdictional error 
is ‘egregious.’”24 Absent a showing that an order is void, the ruling of a bankruptcy court is 
final.25 
Relying on Congressional intent,26 the Fourth Circuit in Wells Fargo held that “the 
bankruptcy court acted well within its jurisdiction when it determined the validity, extent, and 
priority of Wells Fargo’s lien.”27 Further, the failure to follow Rule 7001(2) did not “rise to the 
level of a jurisdictional flaw,”28 because failing to initiate an adversary proceeding was not 
egregious.29 Additionally, the court stated that the order canceling Wells Fargo’s mortgage was 
“clear and unambiguous.”30 On a Rule 60(b) motion, the moving party must show that granting 
the motion would not unfairly prejudice the opposing party.31 Given this, and the fact that the 
order was recorded in the register of deeds, the court held that voiding the order would unfairly 
                                                
21 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2); see Anthony McCready, Comment, Strip-Off: What is the Correct Procedure to Avoid 
a Wholly Unsecured Junior Mortgage, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 463, 490 (2012) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court in Espinosa did not find that the creditor was deprived of due process, even though the debtor failed to initiate 
an adversary proceeding).   
22 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K); see Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d at 302 n.2 (citing Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, —
U.S.—, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (noting that Congress may assign the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations 
to non-Article III courts)). 
23 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 260, 272, (2010) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 
443, 454 (2004)).  
24 Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d. at 302 n.3. 
25 See In re Strongs, 569 B.R. 40, 46 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017).  
26 Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d. at 302 n.2 (“The core of the federal bankruptcy power is ‘restructuring debtor-creditor 
relations . . . .’” (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 464 U.S. 462, 492 (2011)).  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. (emphasis added).  
30 Id. at 301.  
31 Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993).    
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prejudice AMH—a bona fide purchaser—who relied on the recording in good faith when it 
purchased the property in foreclosure.32 
The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Wells Fargo reaffirms the rule promulgated by the 
Supreme Court in United States Aid Funds, Inc. v Espinosa that an adversarial proceeding is not 
required for a bankruptcy court to determine a lien’s status.33 Indeed, courts have already relied 
on Wells Fargo. For example, in In re Leviner the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of North Carolina held that “failure to seek relief through an adversary 
proceeding does not deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction where adequate due process is 
afforded.”34 This view was espoused in In re Strongs (also relying on Wells Fargo), which held 
that absent a properly filed Rule 60(b) motion, bankruptcy court orders are final and binding.35 
Thus, the holdings of Wells Fargo and its progeny foreclose a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute 




                                                
32 Id. (“The very purpose of the race recording statute is ‘to enable purchasers to rely with safety upon the 
examination of the records.’” (quoting Grimes v. Guion, 18 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1942))); see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47-18, 
47-20.  
33 McCready, supra note 20.  
34 In re Leviner, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2584 at 12 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2017) (citing Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d at 301–02).  
35 See In re Strongs, 569 B.R. at 46 (citing Wells Fargo, 859 F.3d 295).  
36 See Dowell, 993 F.2d at 48 (“It is a well settled principal of law that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from a 
final judgment is not a substitute for a timely and proper appeal.”). 
